We present a technique for reducing a normal-form (aka. (bi)matrix) game, O, to a smaller normal-form game, R, for the purpose of computing a Nash equilibrium. This is done by computing a Nash equilibrium for a subcomponent, G, of O for which a certain condition holds. We also show that such a subcomponent G on which to apply the technique can be found in polynomial time (if it exists), by showing that the condition that G needs to satisfy can be modeled as a Horn satisfiability problem. We show that the technique does not extend to computing Pareto-optimal or welfaremaximizing equilibria. We present a class of games, which we call ALAGIU (Any Lower Action Gives Identical Utility) games, for which recursive application of (special cases of) the technique is sufficient for finding a Nash equilibrium in linear time. Finally, we discuss using the technique to compute approximate Nash equilibria.
INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium is the most important solution concept for games. A vector of mixed strategies for the players (that is, for each player, a probability distribution over that player's actions in the game) is a Nash equilibrium if no individual player can benefit from changing her strategy. Every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium [20] . However, for the concept to be operational, the mere existence result is not sufficient: it needs to be accompanied by an algorithm for finding an equilibrium. Unfortunately, even in 2-player normal-form games, it is still unknown whether a polynomial-time algorithm exists for computing a Nash equilibrium. The Lemke-Howson algorithm [15] is the bestknown algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium in a 2-player normal-form game, but it can require exponential time [25] . Some special cases can be solved in polynomial time (for example, zero-sum games [18] ); other related questions, such as finding a welfare-maximizing equilibrium, are NP-hard [11, 5] .
Recently, there has been a renewed surge of interest in the computation of Nash equilibria. Christos Papadmitriou has called the basic problem "a most fundamental computational problem whose complexity is wide open" and "together with factoring, [...] the most important concrete open question on the boundary of P today" [22] , 1 and new (exponential-time) algorithms have been suggested that search over the supports of the mixed strategies [23, 24] . Also, there has been growing interest in computing equilibria of games with special structure that allows them to be represented concisely [13, 16, 2, 12, 1] .
The idea we pursue in this paper is the following. For the basic problem of computing a Nash equilibrium of a normalform game, it would be helpful to have a recursive technique that decomposes a Nash equilibrium computation problem into one or more smaller such problems, in such a way that a solution to the original problem can easily be computed from the solutions to the smaller problems. If there were such a technique that could be applied to any game, and that de-composed it into small enough subproblems, then repeatedly applying this technique would constitute a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium. However, even if the technique could not be applied to all games, it would still be of interest. It could be used as a preprocessing step in computing a Nash equilibrium, thereby reducing the load on the algorithm that is eventually called to solve the irreducible subproblems. The technique could also be applied at intermediate stages of any other algorithm that works by reducing the size of the game. Moreover, there may be special subclasses of games such that the technique can be applied on any of those games, as well as on any subproblem resulting from applying the technique on those games. In that case, the technique would constitute a polynomialtime Nash equilibrium finding algorithm for the particular subclass of games.
In this paper, we introduce such a technique for 2-player normal-form games. When possible, this technique finds a subcomponent, G, of the original game, O, for which a certain condition holds. G is then solved recursively. Based on the recursively computed equilibrium of G, the original game O is then reduced to a smaller game, R, which is also solved recursively. From the computed equilibria of G and R, an equilibrium of the original game O can then easily be constructed. To our knowledge, this is the first recursive technique for computing a Nash equilibrium (other than the iterated elimination of dominated strategies 2 ).
MAIN TECHNIQUE
In this section, we introduce our main technique. We are given a 2-player normal-form game O, in which the row player chooses a pure strategy from Σ 1 and the column player chooses a pure strategy from Σ 2. Suppose that the strategies in Σ 1 can be labeled as ui, si, and those in Σ2 as vj, tj, so that the game can be written as follows:
The condition that allows for writing the game like this is the following:
Against any fixed v j , all the si give the row player the same utility (a j ); and against any fixed ui, all the t j give the column player the same utility (bi).
The intuition for why this condition is useful is the following. Suppose that the row player has decided to play one of the s i, but has not yet decided which si. If the column player plays one of the v j , then it does not matter which of the s i the row player plays. Thus, in deciding which si to play, the row player only needs to consider the probabilities that the column player places on the tj. Symmetrically, if the column player has decided to play one of the t j (but has not yet decided which t j ), then the column player only needs to consider the probabilities that the row player places on the si. Hence, intuitively, the parts of the players' mixed strategies that concern the s i and tj should themselves be in equilibrium.
So, let us compute a Nash equilibrium of the game G (using any technique):
Let p G s i be the row player's probabilities in that Nash equilibrium, and let p G t j be the column player's probabilities. Also, let π G s be the expected utility for the row player, and let π G t be the expected utility for the column player. We can use these to reduce the original game O, as follows. We replace the lower left quadrant of O with a single row. The row player's payoff in the jth entry is a j (which is the row player's payoff in the jth entry for any of the original rows).
The column player's payoff in the jth entry is
that is, the average of the column player's payoffs in the jth entry, taken across the replaced rows, weighted by the probability with which the corresponding s i is played in the computed equilibrium of G. We replace the upper right quadrant of O with a single column in a similar fashion. Finally, we replace the lower right quadrant (G) with a single entry π G s , π G t (the expected utilities of the players in the computed equilibrium of G). Thus, the reduced game R is the following:
We then compute a Nash equilibrium for R (using any technique), obtaining equilibrium probabilities p This is a matching-pennies game where in equilibrium, each player places probability 1/2 on each pure strategy and receives expected utility 2.
3 Thus, the reduced game R becomes:
Again, this is a matching-pennies game where in equilibrium, each player places probability 1/2 on each action. Thus, we have discovered an equilibrium for the original game O where u 1 and v1 are played with probability 1/2 each, and s 1, s2, t1, t2 are played with probability (1/2) · (1/2) = 1/4 each. We now prove the technique is correct in general.
Proof. To show that these mixed strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium for O, we first observe that the row player has no incentive to redistribute the probability placed on strategies s i to another strategy s i . That is, given that the row player plays one of the strategies s i (note that given this, the probability that the row player plays a given strategy
, there is no incentive to switch to another strategy s i . The reason is as follows. Given that the column player plays a given strategy v j , both p G s i and s i will give the same utility. Given that the column player plays one of the strategies t j (note that given this, the probability that the column player plays a given strategy t j is p
As a result, to show that we have an equilibrium for O, we do not need to consider deviations to an arbitrary s i; instead, we only need to consider deviations to the mixed strategy p G s i . Next, we observe that the expected utility for the row player of playing a given u i is the same as in the equilibrium computed for R. The reason is as follows. The probability that the column player plays a given v j is the same in both R and O, and so is the row player's utility for the outcome (u i, vj). Moreover, the probability that the column 3 We emphasize that there is no restriction that the game G or R should be a zero-sum game (or any other special type of game).
player plays one of the strategies tj in O is p R t , and the expected utility for the row player of playing u i in that case is n j=1 p G t j cij, which is the same as in R.
We also observe that the expected utility for the row player of playing p G s i (that is, the row player's mixed strategy given that the row player plays one of the strategies si) is the same as the expected utility of playing s in the equilibrium computed for R. The reason is as follows. The probability that the column player plays a given v j is the same in both R and O, and the row player's utility in either case is a j . Moreover, the probability that the column player plays one of the strategies t j in O is p R t , and the expected utility for the row player of playing p G s i in that case is the expected utility the row player gets in the equilibrium of G, namely, π G s , which is the same as the row player's utility for the outcome (s, t) in R.
But from these last two observations, and the fact that we used an equilibrium for R, it follows that the row player has no incentive to deviate to any u i or to p G s i ; and from the first observation, the fact that the row player has no incentive to deviate to p G s i implies that the row player has no incentive to deviate to any s i. Hence, the row player has no incentive to deviate; by symmetry, neither does the column player.
DETECTING WHETHER THE TECHNIQUE CAN BE APPLIED
It is easy to verify whether Condition 1 holds when the pure strategies of the game are labeled u i, si, vj, tj. However, in general, this labeling will not be given to us. As an example, suppose we are given the following game:
This game is, in fact, the same game that was used as an example in Section 2, with the rows and columns permuted (α 1 = s1, α2 = u1, α3 = s2, β1 = t1, β2 = v1, β3 = t2). But we cannot apply the technique without knowing the labeling of the strategies as u i, si, vj, and tj. Hence, we need an algorithm that finds a labeling of the strategies as u i, si, vj, and tj such that Condition 1 holds. Note that it does not matter whether we label a given strategy (e.g.) s1 or s2. That is, all we need to do is partition the row player's strategies Σ 1 into two subsets, the ones labeled u i and the ones labeled si; and partition the column player's strategies Σ 2 into two subsets, the ones labeled vj and the ones labeled t j .
There are two trivial ways of labeling the strategies so that the condition holds: 1. Label all strategies s i or tj. 2. Label at most one strategy s i, and at most one strategy tj. These trivial labelings are not useful: the first would give us G = O to recurse on, and the second would not reduce the game at all (R = O). Any other labeling for which Condition 1 is satisfied, though, would give us a game G that is smaller than O to recurse on, and reduce the game to a game R that is smaller than O. Moreover, the number of rows (columns) by which R is smaller than O is equal to the number of rows (resp. columns) in G, minus 1. Hence, our objective is to find a labeling for which the condition is satisfied, other than the two trivial ones described above.
We now show how to reformulate this problem as a Horn satisfiability problem. (Recall that a satisfiability clause is a Horn clause if it can be written as (¬x 1 ∨¬x2 ∨. . .∨¬xn ∨y), or equivalently,
Using this, the game described at the beginning of this section has the following Horn clauses:
It is straightforward to check that the only nontrivial satisfying assignment, that is, the only assignment that
• satisfies all these clauses,
• does not set all variables to true, and
• sets either at least two v(α i) to true or at least two v(β j ) to true;
, and v(β3) to true and everything else to false. We note that this corresponds to the labeling that we presented. The Horn clauses can be computed efficiently: We now show that the Horn clauses fully capture the problem, that is, the Horn clauses being satisfied is a necessary and sufficient condition for Condition 1 to be satisfied.
Theorem 2. A labeling of the strategies as u i, si, vj, and t j satisfies Condition 1 if and only if it satisfies all the Horn clauses.
Proof. First, suppose that not all of the Horn clauses are satisfied. Then (without loss of generality) there exist α i 1 , αi 2 , and β j such that v(αi 1 ) ∧ v(αi 2 ) ⇒ v(βj), v(αi 1 ) and v(αi 2 ) are set to true, and v(β j ) is set to false. (Alternatively the roles of the α i and βj could be reversed, but by symmetry we can without loss of generality restrict our attention to the first case.) That is, αi 1 and αi 2 are among the strategies si, β j is among the strategies vj, and αi 1 and αi 2 give the row player different payoffs against β j . But then Condition 1 is not satisfied. Now, suppose that all of the Horn clauses are satisfied. We must show, for any v j , that any si 1 and si 2 give the row player the same payoff against v j . (We must show the same for the u i and the tj, but this will follow by symmetry.) Suppose they do not; then one of the Horn clauses must be v(s i 1 ) ∧ v(si 2 ) ⇒ v(vj). But this clause would then be false, which is contrary to our assumption.
A general systematic approach to finding a nontrivial satisfying assignment is to start by setting two v(α i) (or two v(β j )) to true, and subsequently iteratively apply the implication clauses; if this process ends without all the variables being set to true, we have found an assignment with the desired properties. If we do this once for every initial pair of v(α i) and every initial pair of v(βj), then we will find an assignment with the desired properties if it exists.
For instance, in the above example, we start by setting v(α 1) and v(α2) to true; then, applying the first implication, we find that all the v(β j ) must be set to true as well, and hence by the last implication so must v(α 3) , so that all variables are set to true. Then, we try again, starting by setting v(α 1) and v(α3) to true; by the second implication, we find that v(β 1) and v(β3) must also be set to true. Then we apply the fifth implication, but this does not set any new variables to true, so the process ends here, and we have found an assignment with the desired properties.
Theorem 3. The algorithm described above requires O((|Σ 1| + |Σ2|)
4 ) applications of a Horn clause.
Proof. There are O((|Σ1| + |Σ2|)
2 ) iterations of the outer loop (choosing which pair of variables to start with). Moreover, within each iteration, we never need to apply the same clause twice, and there are only O((|Σ 1| + |Σ2|)
2 ) clauses.
LIMITATIONS OF THE TECHNIQUE
One may wonder whether the technique can be extended to find Nash equilibria with special properties. For example, if we compute a Pareto optimal or social-welfare maximizing Nash equilibrium in each recursive call, will this give us a Pareto optimal or social-welfare maximizing Nash equilibrium for the original game? The following game O shows that this is not the case.
The subcomponent G is as follows:
It has multiple equilibria, but the only Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium is (s 1, t1) . Thus the reduced game R becomes:
This is a Prisoner's Dilemma game where the only equilibrium is (u 1, v1), and thus we will compute the equilibrium (u 1, v1) for the original game O. Unfortunately, this is not a Pareto optimal equilibrium for O, because (s 2, t2) is also a Nash equilibrium for O. Of course, in practice, choosing a Nash equilibrium with high social welfare in each recursive call may still be a useful heuristic for finding good equilibria.
ALAGIU GAMES: A CLASS OF GAMES THAT CAN BE SOLVED BY APPLYING THE TECHNIQUE RECURSIVELY
In general, we may only be able to apply the technique a limited number of times, after which we need to resort to other algorithms to obtain Nash equilibria for games in the recursive calls on which the technique cannot be applied. However, in this section, we present a subclass of normalform games such that the technique works on any of these games, and any game resulting from a recursive call is itself in the subclass as well. Thus, the technique is sufficient for finding a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1. We say that a 2-player normal-form game is an ALAGIU (Any Lower Action Gives Identical Utility) game if each player's strategy set Σ i is a subset of R, and the game has the property that for any pure opponent strategy σ−i ∈ Σ−i, for any σ
1 i , σ 2 i ∈ {σi ∈ Σi : σi < σ−i}, we have π i(σ 1 i , σ−i) = πi(σ 2 i ,
σ−i). That is, given that a player chooses a lower strategy than the opponent, it does not matter to that player which of the lower strategies she chooses.
Before showing how the technique can be applied to (finite) ALAGIU games, we first give some examples. The first one is very simple: Proof. We claim that matching n-sided pennies has the property. This is a zero-sum game, and thus any equilibrium strategy is a minimax strategy. For player 1, the only minimax strategy is to place probability 1/n on each integer, because if player 1 plays some integer with lower probability, the other player will be better off playing that integer. Similarly, for player 2, the only minimax strategy is to place probability 1/n on each integer, because if player 2 plays some integer with higher probability, the other player will be better off playing that integer.
Example 1 (Matching n-sided pennies). In matching n-sided pennies, both players choose an integer in
We note that state-of-the-art equilibrium finding algorithms tend to have difficulty computing equilibria with large supports (i.e. in which the players randomize over many strategies). For example, the PNS algorithm [23] for finding a Nash equilibrium explicitly searches over all (exponentially many) possible supports, searching the smaller supports first. Other algorithms similarly tend to require more time on games that only have equilibria with large supports.
Matching n-sided pennies does not illustrate the full generality of ALAGIU games. The next (somewhat playful) example allows for richer structure:
Example 2 (Vendors on a one-way street) More practically, our final example shows that ALAGIU games also encompass typical auctions. Perhaps surprisingly, in contrast to auctions, bargaining games typically do not have the structure of ALAGIU games.
We discuss this in more detail in the appendix, but we now move on to showing how ALAGIU games can be solved using the technique described in this paper. It turns out that any finite ALAGIU game takes one of three special forms described below, each of which satisfies Condition 1. Consider the highest strategy in the game, that is, σ M = max{σ : σ ∈ Σ 1 ∪ Σ2}. If only the row player has σM in her strategy set (σ M ∈ Σ1 − Σ2), then the game must have the following form:
On the other hand, if only the column player has σM in his strategy set (σ M ∈ Σ2 − Σ1), then the game must have the following form:
Finally, if both the row and the column player have σM in their strategy sets (σM ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2), then the game must have the following form:
Our technique can be applied to every one of these three forms. Moreover, in each case the subcomponent G is still an ALAGIU game, and thus we can apply the technique recursively. The reduced game R is a 2 × 1, 1 × 2, or 2 × 2 game (for the three cases, respectively), so it can easily be solved.
Theorem 4. Using the technique described in this paper, a Nash equilibrium of a finite ALAGIU game can be computed in time O(|Σ 1| · |Σ2|) (that is, in time linear in the size of the game).
Proof. The subcomponent G that the algorithm recurses on is one row and/or column smaller than the current game. Whenever G is one row smaller (which happens O(|Σ 1|) times), after the recursion we need to compute a weighted average of the c ij , which requires O(|Σ2|) time. Similarly, whenever G is one column smaller (which happens O(|Σ 2|) times), after the recursion we need to compute a weighted average of the d ij , which requires O(|Σ1|) time.
USING THE TECHNIQUE TO COMPUTE APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIA
It is known that approximate Nash equilibria can be computed faster than (we know how to compute) exact Nash equilibria [17] . In this section, we study how the technique can be used to compute approximate equilibria. Specifically, if we have found that there is no subcomponent G that satisfies the condition, we can modify the game so that in the modified game O , there does exist a subcomponent G that satisfies the condition. Of course, the equilibria of O and O are, in general, not the same, so that the equilibrium that we compute for O using the technique is not actually an equilibrium for O. However, as we will show, if O is close to O, then the equilibrium that we compute for O is an approximate equilibrium for O. As our notion of distance between two games (of equal dimensions), we will use the maximum difference between two payoffs that occur in the same position in the matrices:
where π r is the row player's utility function and πc is the column player's utility function). We will use -equilibrium as our notion of approximate equilibrium. An -equilibrium is a pair of strategies for the agents such that neither can improve its expected payoff by more than by deviating. pc) − , as desired. By symmetry, the same holds for the column player.
For sufficiently large , we can always find a game O with d(O, O ) ≤ for which there is a subcomponent G satisfying the condition. For example, if is larger than all of the payoffs in the game, then O can simply be the game in which all payoffs are 0. Of course, this weakens the guarantee on how much the agents can gain by deviating. Thus, the challenge is to find a game O that is as close as possible to O while still having a subcomponent G satisfying the condition. One greedy way of finding such a game is the following: for a given column (row), take two utilities that the row (column) player can obtain in this column (row) that are very close, and change both of them (wherever they occur in the column (row)) to the average of the two. Then, check if the modified game has a subcomponent G satisfying the condition using the technique in Section 3; if not, repeat with the modified game.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a technique for reducing a game, O, to a smaller game, R, for the purpose of computing a Nash equilibrium. This is done by computing a Nash equilibrium for a subcomponent, G, of O for which a certain condition holds. We also showed that such a subcomponent G on which to apply the technique can be found in polynomial time (if it exists), by showing that the condition that G needs to satisfy can be modeled as a Horn satisfiability problem. We showed that the technique does not extend to computing Pareto-optimal or welfare-maximizing equilibria. We presented a class of games, which we call ALAGIU (Any Lower Action Gives Identical Utility) games, for which recursive application of (special cases of) the technique is sufficient for finding a Nash equilibrium in linear time. Finally, we discussed using the technique to compute approximate Nash equilibria.
Future research includes extending the techniques presented here to games with more than two players (we note, however, that from the viewpoint of complexity theory, the two-player case is as hard as the n-player case [4] ). It also includes testing experimentally whether the technique is helpful in finding equilibria in games for which we do not have a theoretical result (as we do for ALAGIU games), for instance on test suites of game generators (such as GAMUT [21] ). Of course, the games generated will need to have some structure in order for the technique to have a chance-for example, if the payoffs are drawn independently from an interval of real numbers, then the probability that the technique can be applied is 0, because the probability of any two payoffs being the same is 0. (However, this does not prevent us from searching for approximate equilibria using the technique, as described in Section 6.) Yet another avenue is to find other, complementary game reduction techniques that can be applied when the techniques presented here cannot. Ideally, this would lead to a portfolio of efficient techniques of which at least one can always be applied, giving us a polynomialtime algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium.
